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NOTES 
Rationalizing Administrative Searches 
In announcing the decision of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. last 
year, 1 the Supreme Court laid another brick in the skewed edifice 
of administrative searches under the fourth amendment. By a 
five to three vote, 2 the Court held that warrantless, nonconsen-
sual inspections under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 19703 (OSHA) violate the fourth amendment's prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 In requiring that an OSHA 
inspector obtain a warrant, the Court noted that "[p ]robable 
cause in the criminal law sense is not required. " 5 Instead, it re-
iterated the doctrine of Camara v. Municipal Court6 and See v. 
City of Seattle7 that a lesser showing of suspected reason for a 
search, here referred to as administrative probable cause, satisfies 
the warrant requirement for searches by regulatory bodies. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not consistently ap-
proached the fundamental problems that administrative searches 
present. In first confronting the issue, the Court held that admin-
istrative searches required no warrants at all.8 Eight years later, 
Camara and See overruled that decision, and for a fragile instant 
the law seemed deceptively clear. But then, in the early 1970s, the 
Court resurrected some of the old arguments against search war-
rants and established an exception to the administrative proba-
ble cause requirement.0 Now, Barlow's takes us back the other 
way, limiting the exception and restoring the Camara-See rule to 
1. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
2. Justice Brennan did not participate in the decision. 
3. 29 u.s.c. §§ 651-678 (1976). 
4. The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. 
5. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). 
6. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
7. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
8. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
9. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
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preeminence in fourth amendment jurisprudence. 
The Court's inconsistent reasoning in this case stems from 
the dilemma that administrative search warrants present: how to 
extend fourth amendment protections to subjects of administra-
tive searches while preserving the effectiveness of administrative 
inspections.10 Its attempts to resolve the problem have been so 
riddled with exceptions that no simple rule can explain them all. 
Not surprisingly, they have provoked a wealth of legal commen-
tary and criticism.11 
At the outset, this Note examines the major decisions con-
cerning administrative searches. Specifically, it traces the devel-
opment of a warrant requirement and of the corresponding lower 
standard of probable cause announced in the Camara and See 
decisions. Subsequent modifications of that seemingly absolute 
rule are then analyzed. To develop a framework for evaluating 
administrative search cases, Section II groups those principal 
Supreme Court cases, along with pertinent lower court opinions, 
into three tiers of fourth amendment protection: administrative 
10·. Although the same problem afflicts almost all administrative searches, it is par-
ticularly acute in the case of municipal housing code violations: 
The basic flaw in the fourth amendment approach is that the established standard 
of probable cause required for the issuance of a warrant would have to be greatly 
diluted to accommodate the municipal need - particularly in nascent or existing 
slum areas - for general periodic inspections ..•• Were a showing or'probable 
cause, in the traditional sense, required to secure authorization for these inspec-
tions, municipal health and housing authorities would necessarily have to wait until 
it might well be too late to prevent a health hazard from causing disease or a 
neighborhood from becoming a slum. Relaxation of the standard of probable cause 
would be compelled by the need to avoid these consequences. But once the standard 
were relaxed, the routine issuance of warrants would compromise any effective 
protection against improper searches and perhaps undermine the existing practice 
of delaying searches at the request of the individual homeowner. 
Note, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment - A Rationale, 65 COLUM, 
L. REV. 288, 291 (1965) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Administrative 
Inspections]. 
11. See, e.g., Greenberg, The Balance of Interests and the Fourth Amendment: A 
Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV, 1011 
(1973); LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and 
See Cases, 1967 SuP. CT, REV. 1; McManis & McManis, Structuring Administrative 
Inspections: Is There Any Warrant for a Search Warrant?, 26 AM. U. L. REV, 942 (1977); 
Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened to Ca-
mara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REv. 341 (1975); Note, Administrative Searches and the 
Implied Consent Doctrine: Beyond the Fourth Amendment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 91 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Beyond the Fourth Amendment]; Administrative Inspec-
tions, supra note 10; Note, Warrantless Nonconsensual Searches Under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 93 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
OSHA Searches]; Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MlNN. L. REV. 607 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Administrative Search Warrants]. 
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searches that require a warrant based on a traditional criminal 
standard of probable cause; administrative searches that require 
a warrant based on administrative probable cause; and adminis-
trative searches that require no warrant at all. It critically as-
sesses the theory courts have used to determine what degree of 
protection the subject of a search deserves. 
The Note concludes by suggesting that courts implicitly have 
recognized a distinction between commercial property and pri-
vate dwellings12 in deciding whether to apply the traditional prob-
able cause test or the administrative probable cause test. 13 It then 
recommends a recategorization of searches within the three-
tiered framework consistent with such a distinction. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES 
A. The Era of Frank v. Maryland: Warrantless Administrative 
Inspections 
In Frank v. Maryland, 14 the Supreme Court first addressed 
the issue of whether the fourth amendment required a city official 
enforcing a health and sanitation ordinance to obtain a warrant. 
Responding to a complaint that there were rats in the 4300 block 
of Reisterstown Road, an inspector of the Baltimore Cit_y Health 
Department conducted an investigation. The inspector knocked 
on the door of Aaron Frank. Receiving no answer, }J.e inspected 
12. Those knowledgeable about first amendment history will find such a distinction 
familiar. At one time a "commercial speech" exception existed with respect to the first 
amendment, Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 
622 (1951). The exception was widely criticized and was gradually whittled down over the 
years, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations 
Commn., 413 U.S. 376 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 
until its eventual demise in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
Although commercial speech is no longer excepted from first amendment protection, 
the degree of first amendment protection afforded commercial speech is still lei;s than that 
afforded other forms of speech. See 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. The Virginia Board of Phar-
macy case merely held that commercial speech deserved some degree of first amendment 
protection and that therefore the exception should no longer exist. But in the process, 
the Court recognized that the public need for the regulation of commercial speech justi-
fied a commercial-noncommercial distinction in the first amendment. 425 U.S. at 772. It 
is this sort of distinction which is analogous to the one proposed with respect to the fourth 
amendment. 
13. While the Supreme Court has twice rejected (in See and Barlow's) the argument 
that businesses do not deserve the protection of warrants, it has not said that businesses 
deserve fourth amendment protection identical to that afforded private dwellings. See See 
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967). Indeed, the Court implied just the opposite 
in the See case. See text at note 176 infra. 
14. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
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the area immediately surrounding the house. He found the house 
dilapidated and the surrounding area filled with "approximately 
half a ton" of trash and rodent feces. 15 During the inspection, 
Frank approached the inspector and asked for an explanation. 
The inspector told Frank of his findings and asked permission to 
search the basement of Frank's house. Frank refused. The next 
day the agent returned with two police officers, and after again 
being refused admittance, swore out a warrant for Frank's ar-
rest.16 No search warrant was ever obtained. Appealing his con-
viction, Frank challenged the validity of the Baltimore city ordi-
nance, 17 asserting that inspection of his home without a warrant 
violated the fourth amendment. 18 
A deeply divided Court upheld Frank's conviction. 10 The 
majority, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, analyzed the his-
tory of the fourth amendment and concluded that the framers 
intended the warr;mt requirement to apply only to searches for 
criminal evidence, and not to regulatory inspections promoting 
"minimum community standards of health and well-being."20 
The Court found that the lack of potential criminal liability from 
the search, coupled with the growing need of cities to maintain 
minimum standards of housing and sanitation, rendered the war-
rant requirement superfluous.21 Since the search was regulatory 
15. 359 U.S. at 361. 
16. 359 U.S. at 361. 
17. Frank was charged with a violation of§ 120 of article 12 of the Baltimore City 
Code: 
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance 
exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day 
time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit 
a free examination, he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty 
Dollars. 
Quoted in 359 U.S. at 361. 
18. The fourth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
19. Frank v. Maryland was a five-to-four decision. 
20. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366 (1959). 
21. One of the most intriguing facets of the Frank decision is how Justice Frankfurter 
stressed the interrelationship between the fourth and fifth amendments: 
[T]wo protections emerge from the broad constitutional proscription of official 
invasion. The first of these is the right to be secure from intrusion into personal 
privacy, the right to shut the door on officers of the state unless their entry is under 
proper authority of law. The second, and intimately related protection, is self-
protection: the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its design the secur-
ing of information to fortify the coercive power of the state against the individual, 
information which may be used to effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or 
property. Thus, evidence of criminal action may not, save in very limited and 
closely confined situations, be seized without a judicially issued search warrant. 
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and not criminal ( one supposes Frank's arrest and fine, 22 although 
punitive, were not "criminal" sanctions), the fourth amendment 
did not apply.23 
Justice Douglas, joined by three other dissenting Justices, 
vigorously rejected the majority's premise that the fourth amend-
ment was not meant to apply to searches enforcing a noncriminal 
regulatory code. 24 For the Frank dissenters the fourth amendment 
preserves a citizen's privacy, which may be threatened equally by 
an administrative or a criminal search. 25 
Just one year after Frank, the Supreme Court again con-
fronted the alleged need for a warrant to perform an administra-
tive search in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price. 26 As in Frank, the 
appellant had refused to allow local inspectors to enter his home 
without a warrant. Weakly echoing the result in Frank, an evenly 
divided Court allowed his conviction to stand.27 Justice Brennan, 
however, submitted a separate opinion and renewed Justice 
Douglas's assault upon the distinction between civil and criminal 
searches: 
The public interest in the cleanliness and adequacy of the dwell-
ings of the people is great. So too is the public interest that the 
tools of counterfeiting and the paraphernalia of the illicit narcotics 
traffic not remain active. On an adequate and appropriate showing 
in particular cases, the privacy of the home must bow before these 
interests of the public. But none of these interests provides an open 
sesame to those who enforce them. The Fourth Amendment's pro-
cedure established the way in which these general public interests 
are to be brought into specific focus to require the individual 
householder to open his door. 28 
Notwithstanding the pointed prose of Douglas and Brennan, it 
remained abundantly clear until 1967 that no official performing 
359 U.S. at 365. The theory that criminal searches and administrative searches may be 
distinguished on the basis of potential criminal liability has received both support and 
criticism. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949); LaFave, 
supra note 11, at 5; Beyond the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 11; Administrative 
Search Warrants, supra note 11, at 612. Although the Court in Camara and See purported 
to discard the distinction, traces of it linger today in administrative search cases. See, e.g., 
United States v. Anile, 352 F. Supp. 14 (N.D. W. Va. 1973). 
22. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362 (1959). . 
23. 359 U.S. at 366. 
24. 359 U.S. at 375-76 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
25. 359 U.S. at 374 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
26. 364 U.S. 263 (1960). 
27. Justice Stewart took no part in the Eaton case. 
28. 364 U.S. at 272-73 (emphasis in original). The Chief Justice, Justice Black, and 
Justice Douglas joined Brennan's separate opinion. Not surprisingly, this block was iden-
tical to the dissenting faction in Frank. 
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a search for health and safety code violations needed to trouble 
himself to obtain a search warrant. 
B. Camara and See: Warrant Protection for Administrative 
Inspections 
The companion decisions of Camara v. Municipal Court20 
and See v. City of Seattle30 vindicated the arguments of the Frp,nk 
dissenters. Camara challenged an annual warrantless housing 
inspection authorized by the San Francisco Municipal Code.31 
After the appellant three times refused to allow inspectors to 
enter his ground floor apartment without a warrant, he was ar-
rested. 32 The state court denied Camara's petition for a writ of 
prohibition, but on appeal, the Supreme Court ordered that the 
writ be issued, holding that Camara "had a constitutional right 
to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search"33 and that 
he "may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent 
to the inspection. "34 
In overruling Frank v. Maryland, the majority first attacked 
that case's distinction between criminal and civil searches: 
It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private 
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when 
the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. For instance, even 
the most law-ab1ding citizen has a very tangible interest in limit-
ing the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may 
be broken by official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry 
under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal 
and family security. 3li 
The Court concluded that in administrative inspections, as in 
criminal ones, the fourth amendment requires an independent 
29. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
30. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
31. Section 503 of the San Francisco Municipal Code, quoted in 387 U.S. at 526: 
Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be 
necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper 
credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, 
or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal 
Code. 
32. Camara was charged with violating § 507 of the Municipal Code, which provided 
for a $500 fine or imprisonment for not more than six months. 387 U.S. at 527 n.2. 
33. 387 U.S. at 540. 
34. 387 U.S. at 540. 
35. 387 U.S. at 530-31 (footnote omitted). The Court also pointed out that even if the 
civil-criminal distinction were valid, it would frequently be irrelevant, as regulatory 
inspections are typically enforced by criminal sanctions such as fines and imprisonment, 
387 U.S. at 531. 
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magistrate's review before a governmental official may intrude 
upon a citizen's privacy:36 "[E]xcept in certain carefully defined 
classes of cases, a search of private property without proper con-
sent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid 
search warrant. " 37 
Having decided that administrative searches do require war-
rants, the Court then had to face squarely the dilemma posed at 
the outset of this Note: How can regulatory inspection schemes 
be adequately enforced if inspectors must always obtain a search 
warrant? Such inspections typically are random spot checks, pre-
ventive in nature, based upon such factors as "passage of time, 
the nature of the building ... , or the condition of the entire 
area, "38 rather than upon a reasonable belief that any violation 
exists. 
The Supreme Court's rather innovative solution to this prob-
lem was to create a new standard of probable cause for adminis-
trative search warrants. Recognizing that periodic inspections are 
often the only effective means to gain compliance with the re-
quirements of municipal codes, the Court held that a reasonable-
ness test determines probable cause in an administrative search, 39 
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the 
search entails."40 In short, "[i]f a valid public interest justifies 
the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue 
36. 387 U.S. at 532-33. 
37. 387 U.S. at 528-29. The Court refused to except administrative searches from the 
warrant requirement: 
We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are 
not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for indivi-
dualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk 
of a criminal penalty. 
387 U.S. at 533. As this passage demonstrates, even though the Court purported to reject 
the civil-criminal distinction, it reverted to that distinction to support its arguments. The 
distinction appears to be one that refuses to die. It results from an overlap of the fourth 
and fifth amendments that apparently exists in the minds of lawyers and judges. See note 
111 infra. 
38. 387 U.S. at 538. 
39. 387 U.S. at 535-36. This test does not appear consistent with the wording of the 
fourth amendment. The fourth amendment requires "probable cause" to show that an 
otherwise unreasonable search is constitutionally acceptable. The Camara Court took 
what had been an independent standard - probable cause - and made it depend on the 
reasonableness of the search. The new test is at best circular (a search is reasonable ifthere 
is probable cause, and probable cause exists if it is reasonable) and at worst self-
contradictory (an unreasonable search requires probable cause, yet probable cause exists 
if the search is reasonable). This seemingly untenable standard is the inconsistency 
pointed out by the dissents of Justice Clark in See, 387 U.S. at 546, and Justice Stevens 
in Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 325. 
40. 387 U.S. at 537. 
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a suitably restricted search warrant. " 41 
The Supreme Court presented three reasons justifying the 
less stringent probable cause requirement for administrative 
search warrants. First, the public and the judiciary had long ac-
cepted such code enforcement inspections. 42 Second, given the 
unconstitutionality of warrantless searches, the new standard 
provided the only means of effective enforcement. 43 Finally, such 
inspections were "neither personal in nature nor aimed at the 
discovery of crime" and therefore "involved a relatively limited 
invasion of the urban citizen's privacy."44 
On the same day as Camara, the Court also decided See v. 
City of Seattle45 and extended its new administrative probable 
cause standard to commercial inspections. The appellant in See 
had refused to allow Seattle fire inspectors to enter his commer-
cial warehouse without a warrant and without probable cause to 
believe that any violation existed. The Supreme Court reversed 
the appellant's conviction under the Seattle Fire Code, 46 holding 
that Camara's warrant requirement for administrative inspec-
tions protected commercial premises as well as homes. 47 
41. 387 U.S. at 539. This flexible probable cause standard starkly contrasts with the 
rigid probable cause standard of criminal search warrants. There must be sufficient evi-
dence to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is 
in the process of being committed, and that the premises contain legally seizable material. 
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). See text at notes 87-94 infra. 
42. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 537. 
43. 387 U.S. at 537. 
44. 387 U.S. at 537. Ironically, the Court, in its effort to support the lower standard 
of probable cause for administrative search warrants, adopted practically the same argu-
ments that had been used to justify warrantless inspections in Frank. As a result, several 
commentators have questioned whether Camara really offers any significant increase in 
fourth amendment protection. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 11, at 27. 
45. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
46. Section 8.01.050 of the Seattle Fire Code, quoted in 387 U.S. at 541: 
It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and 
premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the 
purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause 
fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance 
concerning fire hazards. 
47. The Court expressed this notion twice in the See opinion: 
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go 
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commer-
cial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the deci-
sion to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced 
by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant, 
387 U.S. at 543. 
We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon the por-
tions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be com-
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Together, Camara and See signalled two significant changes 
in the Supreme Court's fourth amendment philosophy. First, the 
Court recognized the warrant requirement as the primary safe-
guard of fourth amendment rights. In other words, the reason-
ableness of a search under the first clause of the fourth amend-
ment depends largely upon whether the warrant requirement in 
the amendment's second clause is met.48 Second, the Court in 
Camara and See adopted a balancing test to assess inspections 
and searches that do not involve the exigent circumstances nor-
mally associated with exceptions to the warrant requirement. 49 
Significantly, that balancing test led the Court to modify the 
warrant mechanism rather than to fashion another exception, 50 
and thus it created a new standard of administrative probable 
cause. 
C. Colonnade and Biswell: The "Pervasively Regulated" 
Exception 
The Court had hinted in See that businesses might not in all 
circumstances enjoy the same fourth amendment protection as 
private dwellings. 51 In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States, 52 the Court fulfilled that prophecy. The defendant in 
Colonnade, a licensed liquor dealer, challenged the admissibility 
of untaxed liquor that federal agents had seized during a warrant-
less forcible search of his dealership. The district court granted 
the dealer's motion to suppress the evidence, but the court of 
appeals reversed, holding that the search was reasonable under 
the fourth amendment. 53 The Supreme Court reversed the court 
of appeals and ordered the evidence suppressed, but only because 
the forcible nature of the seizure violated the federal statute that 
pelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant 
procedure. 
387 U.S. at 545 (footnote omitted). 
48. This is not a necessary interpretation of the fourth amendment. The dissents of 
Justice Clark in See, 387 U.S. at 546, and Justice Stevens in Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 325, 
persuasively argued that if a search meets the reasonableness test in the first clause of 
the amendment, no warrant should be required for the search. Their approach to the 
fourth amendment also asserts that the probable cause standard for warrants in the 
second clause of the amendment is an inflexible one that cannot be diluted by increased 
governmental interest in the inspection. 
49. 387 U.S. at 534-35. 
50. See Greenberg, supra note 11, at 1012. 
51. See note 172 infra and accompanying text. 
52. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
53. 410 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1969), revd., 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
1300 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1291 
authorized the search.54 The Court, through Justice Douglas, held 
that Congress had determined by statute that searches, if carried 
out as prescribed in the provisions of the act, were per se reasona-
ble under the fourth amendment and required no warrant. Gs But 
since the statute did not authorize forcible entry of the kind in 
this case, the search did not fall within the class of congression-
ally established reasonable searches, and therefore required a 
warrant.56 
The Court emphasized the liquor industry's long history of 
legislative regulation, a history that predated the drafting of the 
Constitution.57 The Court used that history to justify Congress's 
power to legislate the reasonableness of searches of regulated li-
quor dealers58 (and hence the applicability of the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirements). The Colonnade decision thus ex-
cepted the liquor industry from the warrant requirement of 
Camara and See. 
One might think that, due to the unique history of liquor 
regulation, the exception would have stopped there. However, 
two years later, the Colonnade exception assumed a much 
broader scope in United States v. Biswell. 59 A federal treasury 
agent visited Biswell, a pawnshop operator federally licensed to 
sell sporting weapons. The agent inspected Biswell's books and 
then requested to see the locked gun storeroom. Biswell asked the 
agent if he had a search warrant. The agent replied that none was 
necessary as the inspection was authorized by section 923(g) of 
the Gun Control Act of 1968, 60 and gave Biswell a copy of the 
relevant portion of the statute. Biswell then admitted the agent 
to the storeroom, and the ensuing search uncovered two untaxed 
and illegal sawed-off shotguns. 61 Biswell unsuccessfully at-
tempted to have the evidence excluded from his trial and was 
convicted of violating the Gun Control Act. 
54. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 903 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 7606 
(1976)). The statute empowered government agents to enter and search any premises 
where articles subject to liquor tax are produced or kept. Refusal to allow entry brought a 
penalty of $500. 26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1976). 
55. 397 U.S. at 77. 
56. 397 U.S. at 77. 
57. For interesting descriptions of liquor industry regulation from colonial times 
through Prohibition, see R. CHILDS, MAKING REPEAL WORK (1947); J. POLLARD, THE RoAD 
TO REPEAL (1932); G. THOMANN, COLONIAL LIQUOR LAWS (1887). 
58. 397 U.S. at 77. 
59. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
60. 18 u.s.c. §§ 921-928 (1976). 
61. 406 U.S. at 312. 
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The conviction was reversed by the court of appeals62 which 
was, in turn, reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court held that 
the treasury agent had not violated the fourth amendment. Un-
like the agents in Colonnade, this one conducted the search in a 
manner fully authorized by the statute; as a result, the search, 
according to the reasoning of Colonnade, was per se reasonable 
without a warrant. 63 
In holding that searches of gun dealers under the Gun Con-
trol Act require no warrant, the Court drew an analogy to federal 
regulation of liquor.64 It distinguished See with the comment that 
while periodic inspections adequately enforce most municipal 
housing and fire codes, effective gun control necessitates 
"unannounced, even frequent, inspections. " 65 A warrant require-
ment for such searches would either frustrate enforcement of the 
Act or so dilute the probable cause requirement as to neutralize 
any of the protection normally associated with a warrant. 66 
In effect, the Biswell Court held that, in certain situations, 
Congress can statutorily define a reasonable search and thus 
waive the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. The legality 
of such searches depends not upon the authority of a valid war-
rant, but upon "the authority of a valid statute."67 The Court 
apparently did not find that the newly created warrant exception 
posed any significant threat to privacy in the limited context of 
its decision. 68 
The decisions in Colonnade and Biswell spawned a series of 
lower court decisions that greatly expanded the exception for per-
vasively regulated industries. Indeed, the exception threatened to 
engulf the rule. By reasoning similar to that of Biswell, courts 
found businesses inspected by the Food and Drug Administration 
to be pervasively regulated and thus not subject to any warrant 
62. Biswell v. United States, 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971), revd., 406 U.S. 311 
(1972). 
63. 406 U.S. at 314. 
64. The Court deemphasized the unique historical status of the liquor industry, 
which seemed so vital to the Colonnade decision. Instead, it stressed the compelling need 
to regulate firearms: 
Federal regulation of the interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in 
history as in governmental control of the liquor industry, but close scrutiny of this 
traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime 
and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders. 
406 U.S. at 315. 
65. 406 U.S. at 316. 
66. 406 U.S. at 316. 
67. 406 U.S. at 315. 
68. 406 U.S. at 317. 
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requirement. 69 The exception also spread to searches and inspec-
tions by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs70 as well 
as those enforcing the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.71 
D. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: The Pendulum Swings 
During that period of exceptional expansion, the constitu-
tionality of inspections under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)72 came under challenge. One court 
held that OSHA inspections lie within the Colonnade-Biswell 
exception and that no warrant is necessary. 73 Other district courts 
required a warrant for OSHA inspections but preserved the con-
stitutionality of the Act by finding a mandate of warrants based 
upon administrative probable cause within the statute's vague 
language. 74 
The district court in Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery15 took still a third 
approach to OSHA inspections. Bill Barlow, president and gen-
eral manager of an electrical and plumhing business, received a 
visit from an OSHA inspector in September 1975. Barlow asked 
the inspector if he had received a complaint about his company. 
When the inspector answered no, Barlow asked him if he had a 
search warrant. After receiving a second no, Barlow refused to 
admit the inspector to the nonpublic portion of the premises. 
Three months later, the Secretary of Labor obtained an order 
compelling Barlow to admit the inspector. Undaunted, Barlow 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Acri Wholesale Grocery Co., 409 F. Supp. 529 (S.D, 
Iowa 1976); United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Okla. 1973); 
United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333 (D.D.C. 1973); United States v. Del Campo 
Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972). The District Court in Business Builders 
even went so far as to say: "In effect, the statute [authorizing inspections] takes the place 
of a valid search warrant." 354 F. Supp. at 143. But see United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 
174 (1952). 
70. United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd., 480 F.2d 918 
(3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1971). 
71. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973). But 
see United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 560 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated, 436 
U.S. 942 (1978). The lower courts in Consolidation Coal had required a warrant for inspec• 
tions under the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1976), but 
only used the administrative probable cause standard. The Supreme Court vacated the 
case in light of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
72. 29 u.s.c. §§ 651-678 (1976). 
73. Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974). 
74. Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont. 1977); Usery v. 
Centrif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Brennan v. Gibson's Prods. Inc., 
407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627 
(D.N.M. 1976). 
75. 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), affd., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
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again refused access and sought injunctive relief against OSHA's 
warrantless search demand. The district court concluded that a 
warrant must accompany any OSHA inspection; it refused, how-
ever, to interpret OSHA so broadly as to include a warrant mech-
anism and therefore held section 657(a) of the Act unconstitu-
tional under the fourth amendment. 76 The Supreme Court noted 
probable jurisdiction77 to resolve the conflicting interpretations of 
OSHA and to clarify the scope of the Colonnade-Biswell excep-
tion. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court panel.78 Ini-
tially, it observed that the fourth amendment was "intended to 
shield places of business as well as of residence. " 79 Camara and 
See were thus controlling. The Court distinguished Colonnade 
and Biswell, saying they should truly be the exception and not 
the rule:80 
The element that distinguishes [the liquor and gun industries] 
from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government 
supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a busi-
ness must already be aware.81 · 
76. 424 F. Supp. at 442. 
77. 430 U.S. 964 (1976). 
78. 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (five-to-three decision). Justice Brennan did not participate 
in the decision. 
79. 436 U.S. at 312. Justice White's majority opinion reached this conclusion by 
analyzing the historical circumstances of the fourth amendment's adoption: 
The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies immedi-
ately preceding the Revolution. The particular offensiveness it engendered was 
acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were 
inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary revenue measures that 
most irritated the colonists. 
436 U.S. at 311 (footnotes omitted). 
Justice White's history lesson, however, became the foundation for a counterargu-
ment in Justice Stevens's dissent. If the colonists feared the general warrant, then the 
fourth amendment arguably was intended to prevent not warrantless searches but 
searches with warrants that provided little or no protection: 
The Framers' familiarity with the abuses attending the issuance of such general 
warrants provided the principal stimulus for the restraints on arbitrary governmen-
tal intrusions embodied in the Fourth Amendment. . . . Since the general warrant, 
not the warrantless search, was the immediate evil at which the Fourth Amend-
ment was directed, it is not surprising that the Framers placed precise limits on 
its issuance. The requirement that a warrant only issue on a showing of particular~ 
ized probable cause was the means adopted to circumscribe the warrant power. 
436 U.S. at 327-28. Justice White solved the administrative search dilemma by requiring 
administrative probable cause for OSHA warrants. However, warrants issued upon that 
lesser standard come perilously close to being the "general" warrants that the fourth 
amendment was designed to eliminate. 
80. 436 U.S. at 313. 
81. 436 U.S. at 313. 
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OSHA, unlike federal liquor and gun control laws, regulates not 
a single, discrete industry but rather the whole of American busi-
ness. And the Court flatly refused to find that all interstate com-
merce fell under the rubric of "pervasively regulated": 
Nor can any but the most fictional sense of voluntary consent to 
later searches be found in the single fact that one conducts a busi-
ness affecting interstate commerce; under current practice and 
law, few businesses can be conducted without having some effect 
on interstate commerce . . . . 
... The owner of a business has not, by the necessary utiliza-
tion of employees in his operation, thrown open the areas where 
employees alone are permitted to the warrantless scrutiny of Gov-
ernment agents. 82 
Recognizing the need to balance a business's fourth amend-
ment rights against the need for effective enforcement through 
periodic, random inspections not based on suspected violations, 
the Court turned to the lesser standard of probable cause an-
nounced in Camara and See. 83 It rejected the argument that the 
lower standard of administrative probable cause would result in 
rubber stamp warrants providing only illusory protection to the 
target of the inspection.84 Having determined that the Constitu-
tion requires a warrant for OSHA searches, and carefully limiting 
itself to the "specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees" 
relevant to searches under that particular statute, 85 the Court 
held the Act unconstitutional. 86 
II. WHAT THE COURT HATH WROUGHT - A THREE-TIERED 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Though the route is tortuous, the Supreme Court's adminis-
trative search decisions in the past decade chart a course between 
privacy rights and administrative needs. The cases culminating 
in Barlow's suggest three distinct degrees of fourth amendment 
protection: (1) warrants issued on traditional probable cause; (2) 
warrants issued on administrative probable cause; and (3) war-
rantless exceptions. 
82. 436 U.S. at 314-15. 
83. 436 U.S. at 320. The evidence necessary to establish administrative probable 
cause is discussed in text at notes 115-30 infra. 
84. 436 U.S. at 322-24. 
85. 436 U.S. at 323. 
86. 436 U.S. at 325. 
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A. Traditional Probable Cause 
The fourth amendment specifies that "no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause.''87 While all authorities agree that 
probable cause is a prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant, what 
quantum of evidence constitutes probable cause and whether 
that quantum should be fixed or flexible remain in dispute. 
In criminal law, the articulated standard of probable cause 
is relatively settled:88 "Probable cause exists if the facts and cir-
cumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believ-
ing that the offense has been committed. "89 Evidence showing a 
mere probability of criminal activity satisfies this standard: the 
evidence need not be sufficient to convict or even amount to a 
prima facie showing of an offense. 90 In fact, hearsay evidence, 
although inadmissible at trial, may support a warrant "so long 
as there [is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. " 91 
An affidavit supporting a warrant based on traditional prob-
able cause must, however, contain more than mere conclusory 
statements by the affiant. It must present some evidence of the 
"underlying circumstances" upon which either the affiant's con-
clusions or those of his informant were based. 92 If the affiant relied 
on an informant, his affidavit must also support the informant's 
credibility.93 -· 0 
Factual evidence supporting the affiant's conclusions en-
ables the magistrate - the central figure in the warrant proce-
dure - to assess the reasonableness of the proposed search in-
87. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See note 4 supra. The Supreme Court has expounded on 
the historical basis of the probable cause requirement, most notably in Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978), and in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 
(1959): 
The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The 
general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and 
the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the 
oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion. Police 
control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of "probable cause" 
before a magistrate was required. 
(footnotes omitted). 
88. The application of the standard to particular fact situations, in contrast, is not 
nearly so clear. Compare, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), with Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
89. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). 
90. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 
380 U.S. 102 (1965). 
91. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960). 
92. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965). Accord, Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
93. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
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dependently. The magistrate stands as a buffer between the 
government and the private individual. Weighing the interests 
of privacy and of efficient law enforcement that inevitably clash 
in any search or inspection, he determines whether the facts 
justify the search. 94 
B. Administrative Probable Cause 
The most notable aspect of the Camara and See decisions is 
the determination that the term "probable cause" in the fourth 
amendment need not mean the same thing for all government 
searches. The standard of administrative probable cause estab-
lished in those cases does not require any evidence of a violation 
of the law, nor must the warrant specify .the articles to be seized 
or the area to be searched. 95 Instead, the government need show 
only that the inspection is necessary to further the legitimate 
goals of the authorizing statute. 98 Moreover, the affidavit support-
ing the warrant need not allege conditions then existing on the 
premises that are the subject of the search. 97 The magistrate con-
ducts a balancing test, weighing the need for the search against 
the invasion of privacy that it entails.98 
Some legal theorists object to the reduced standard of proba-
ble cause. They suggest that traditional probable cause should be 
94. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
21, 22 (1968); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
95. See McManis & McManis, supra note 11, at 960; OSHA Searches, supra note 11, 
at 110. 
96. See OSHA Searches, supra note 11, at 110. 
97. Id. 
98. McManis & McManis, supra note 11, at 960. Courts have applied this standard 
to search warrants sought by numerous federal agencies. See, e.g., General Motors v. 
Kostler, No. 78-7053 (E.D. Mich., filed March 14, 1978); Morris v. United States Dept. 
of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Ill. 1977); Marshall v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 433 F. 
Supp. 330 (E.D. Wis. 1977); United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 
1971). See also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (subpoena 
duces tecum for Department of Labor). 
Unfortunately, the balance in most applications for administrative warrants is inher-
ently one-sided. The warrant proceeding before a magistrate is almost always ex parte, 
and the citizen never has the opportunity to present facts to bolster the privacy-interest 
side of the scale. See LaFave, supra note 11, at 30. As a result, the privacy interest in the 
balance almost never receives specific attention; instead, the warrant hearing concen-
trates on the government's claims of statutory authority. Professor LaFave suggests a 
remedy to this problem: Notify owners of premises that the government proposes to search 
and allow them to contest the warrant proceeding. LaFave, supra note 11, at 31. Of course, 
such a mechanism could cause considerable delay and frustrate the enforcement of valid 
regulatory schemes, a result that the Court in Camara and See struggled to avoid. 
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the exclusive fourth amendment standard.99 Professor LaFave 
takes a less extreme view, but he cautions:_ 
Although [the fact that the traditional probable cause standard 
greatly hinders enforcement] would undoubtedly lead many to the 
conclusion that a different sort of probable cause should be re-
quired for administrative inspections, this result should not be 
lightly reached. To say that the probable cause required by the 
, Fourth Amendment is not a fixed tes~, but instead involves a sort 
99. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. See also Greenberg, supra note 11, at 
1014. 
At one time the Supreme Court appeared to adopt this View: "This [fourth amend-
ment] prevents the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact. It empha-
sizes the purpose to protect against all general searches . . ... The Amendment is to be 
liberally construed." Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) 
(evidence obtained from search pursuant to warrant containing no particulars of alleged 
violation of National Prohibition Act excluded; defendant's'conviction overturned). 
In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372-73 (1959), Justice Frankfurter declared that 
it was better to create a complete exception to the probable cause standard than to give 
flexibility to the probable cause standard: · ' ' 
If a search warrant be constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly 
interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue. A 
loose basis for granting a search warrant for the situation before us is to enter by 
way of the back door to a recognition of the fact that by reason of their intrinsic 
elements, their historic sanctions, and their safeguards, tne Maryland proceedings 
requesting permission to make a search without intruding .when permission is de-
nied, do not offend the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The fear was that administrative probable cause would provide-no genuine protection for 
the subject of the search; the issuance of an administrative warrant might become nothing 
more than a "rubber stamp process" with the magistrate deferring to the expertise of the 
agency seeking the warrant. LaFave, supra note 11, at 27. · 
However, the dual probable cause-standard is not without constitutional backing. The 
standard was perhaps most eloquently defended by Justice Douglas in his dissent in 
Frank: . 
Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify 
an inference of "probable cause" to make an inspection are clearly different from 
those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been 
undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of certain facili-
ties, without a further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions 
dangerous to the public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period 
without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the 
issuance of a warrant. The test of "probable cause" requfred by the Fourth Amend-
ment can take into account the nature of the search that is being sought. That is 
not to sanction synthetic search warrants but to recognize that the showing of 
probable cause in a health case may have quite different requirements than the one 
required in graver situations. 
359 U.S. at 383. Since the Court explicitly recognized the constitutionality of the dual 
probable cause standard in Camara, See, and Barlow's, continued attack on it might well 
be dismissed as a pointless academic exercise. Nonetheless, such exercise does underscore 
a constitutional necessity: Whatever probable cause standard the Constitution requires 
for a particular search, it must provide genuine protection and not become an empty 
ritual. 
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of calculus incorporating all the surrounding circumstances of the 
intended search, constitutes a major departure from existing con-
stitutional doctrine. And it could well be a departure with a multi-
tude of consequences.100 
The argument for the single probable cause standard stresses 
the possibility that a search under a less stringent standard might 
uncover evidence of a crime.101 A solution offered by at least one 
commentator is to issue warrants on administrative probable 
cause, but to exclude evidence gained in that search from any 
subsequent criminal prosecution.102 The trouble with that solu-
tion is that nearly all administrative and regulatory inspection 
schemes provide some sort of criminal sanctions, albeit minor 
ones.103 Furthermore, it is a solution the courts do not seem pre-
pared to accept. Several have already upheld criminal convic-
tions based on evidence seized during searches justified by ad-
ministrative probable cause.104 
So how did the Supreme Court justify the lesser standard of 
probable cause for administrative searches? The Camara Court 
first argued that administrative inspections had "a long history 
of judicial and public acceptance."105 Professor LaFave points out 
that this argument is historically inaccurate and logically un-
sound: Cases reviewing periodic and area inspections are rare, 
and "acquiescence" may more accurately describe the public's 
attitude toward the searches than "acceptance."106 Moreover, the 
Court has seldom felt restrained by even substantial histories of 
100. LaFave, supra note 11, at 12-13 (footnotes omitted). 
101. The basic argument is that the defendant should not be subjected to criminal 
liability upon evidence that could have been obtained only through an administrative 
warrant because insufficient evidence existed for a criminal warrant: 
But evidence seized under the administrative search exception is not limited to 
administrative proceedings. It may well be found that the continued existence of 
standards for administrative "inspections" less strict than those for criminal 
searches, notwithstanding the greater degree of culpability associated with criminal 
activity, represents a severe diminution of those constitutional safeguards formerly 
provided by the fourth amendment. The constriction will continue unabated only 
at an exorbitant price. 
Beyond the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 122. 
102. Administrative Inspections, supra note 10, at 292-95. 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1974). 
104. See, e.g., United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1974) (conviction 
on federal liquor law violation based upon See-type standard upheld); United States v. 
Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd., 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973) (seizure 
of illegal guns during administrative narcotics search upheld); United States v. Ciaccio, 
356 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Md. 1972) (illegal firearm seized in administrative search under 
federal liquor law admitted as evidence). 
105. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 537. 
106. LaFave, supra note 11, at 14. 
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judicial and public acceptance when convinced that accepted 
practice was unconstitutional.107 
The Camara Court also felt that the compelling need for 
enforcement of public safety regulations demanded that such 
administrative inspections be liberated from a traditional proba-
ble cause test.108 Unfortunately, that argument begs the question; 
the real issue is whether the Constitution mandates traditional 
probable cause for all governmental intrusions. If so, the compet-
ing public need must be subordinated to the mandates of the 
fourth amendment. Otherwise - if the public interest in efficient 
enforcement of health and safety regulations were truly control-
ling - the same reasoning would dictate a lower probable cause 
standard for criminal searches as well: 
Although others have also asserted a need for 100 percent enforce-
ment of these ordinances, it is difficult to accept that as a justifica-
tion for a diluted probable cause test. One might as cogently argue 
that there is a need for universal compliance with the criminal law 
and that the public interest demands that all dangerous offenders 
be convicted and punished. It is certainly not a novel observation 
that in the field of criminal law this argument has not prevailed, 
and that instead we are committed to a philosophy tolerating a 
certain level of undetected crime as preferable to an oppressive 
police state. If there is a greater public interest in total enforce-
ment of housing codes than _pf the criminal law, the Camara opin- · 
ion does not explain why. 109 
107. Id. 
108. 387 U.S. at 535-36. 
109. LaFave, supra note 11, at 14 (footnotes omitted). LaFave does not, however, 
advocate the elimination of administrative probable cause. In lieu of the three arguments 
offered by the majority in Camara, he proposes two justifications for the lower standard 
of probable cause. One is "the inability to acomplish an acceptable level of code enforce-
ment under the traditional probable cause test." Id. at 20. Unlike the criminal law, where 
the public nature of most crimes permits effective enforcement notwithstanding the stiffer 
traditional probable cause requirement, enforcement of health and safety regulatory 
schemes is frustrated by traditional probable cause because of the inherent difficulty of 
detecting code violations at their incipient stages. Id. at 16. 
LaFave's second contention supporting the administrative probable cause test closely 
tracks the Court's third line of reasoning in Camara: Periodic and area inspection pro-
grams for code enforcement involve a "relatively minor invasion of personal privacy and 
dignity." Id. at 20. LaFave argues that inspecting plumbing fixtures and electric wiring 
does not intrude upon personal privacy and dignity as much as rummaging through desk 
drawers and personal belongings. 
Yet that argument overlooks two points. Frequently, administrative inspections do 
involve more than a survey of physical fixtures. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 
(1971). This is particularly true of inspections of business premises, which often require 
inspection of business papers. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); United States 
ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F. 2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); 
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The Camara Court attempted to distinguish such an overex-
tension of its reasoning with a third argument: regulatory health 
and safety inspections do not involve as significant an invasion 
of the citizen's privacy as a criminal search.110 This view is clearly 
a remnant of the distinction between criminal and civil searches 
that undergirded the early Frank case. 111 Yet it conflicts with the 
United States v. Habig, 474 F.2d 57 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); United 
States v. Cre,spo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D. Md. 1968); People v. Curco Drugs, Inc., 76 Misc. 
2d 222, 350 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1973). 
Moreover, even if such inspections scan only the physical facilities, it is questionable, 
at least in the home, whether the citizen suffers a lesser intrusion upon privacy. One can 
hardly imagine a clearer illustration of an invasion of personal privacy than a government 
code inspector checking the wiring and light switches in one's bedroom, or examirting the 
plumbing fixtures in the bathroom. Indeed, as Judge Perryman sagely remarked in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd., 339 U.S. 1 (1950), "even if 
the front door of the house is no longer protected by the Constitution, surely it had been 
thought until now that the bathroom is." 178 F.2d at 18. Thus, LaFave's notion that such 
inspections present a lesser intrusion of privacy must originate in the much-maligned yet 
persistent distinction between criminal searches and civil-code enforcement inspections. 
See notes 21 & 37 supra. 
110. 387 U.S. at 537. 
111. The civil-criminal distinction should be laid to rest. It has survived only by 
feeding on a fundamental misunderstanding of the fourth amendment. The fifth amend-
ment protects against self-incrimination. The fourth amendment, in contrast, guards 
personal privacy. See LaFave, supra note 11, at 7. The relationship that may exist between 
these two distinct amendments was first recognized in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616 (1886). However, that relationship regrettably was blurred by an intermingling of the 
two amendments as a single "law of searches and seizures" in Davis v. United States, 328 
U.S. 582, 587 (1946), and Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). For fully twelve years 
since Camara and See, the Supreme Court has attempted to dispel this constitutional 
misinterpretation, but the notion remains. The relatively early case of District of Colum-
bia u. Little forcefully refuted the basic error of the civil-criminal distinction: 
It is argued that the Fourth Amendment provision regarding searches is premised 
upon and limited by the Fifth Amendment provision regarding self. 
incrimination. . . . The argument is wholly without merit, preposterous in fact. 
The basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not protection against 
self-incrimination; it was the common-law right of a man to privacy in his 
home. . . . It was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime. It belonged to all 
men, not merely to criminals, real or suspected. . . . To say that a man suspected 
of a crime has a right to protection against search of his home without a warrant, 
but that a man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurd-
ity. 
178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd., 339 U.S. 1 (1950). 
The fourth amendment should stand as a grant of the fundamental freedom from 
government intrusion in private areas. See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy 
in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 212, 250; Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz 
Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154 (1977). Where emergency conditions 
necessitate relaxation of fourth amendment standards, a few exceptions are allowed be-
grudgingly. See, e.g., Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (Qearch incident to lawful 
arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 
294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile excep• 
tion). 
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reasoning in Camara that compelled the overruling of Frank. In 
the words of Professor Beaney: 
The most disturbing aspect of the Frank and Eaton decisions is the 
rationale of Justice Frankfurter that the Fourth Amendment 
means less when invoked to protect privacy than it does when used 
to restrict official searches for evidence. One justification for the 
application of the Fourth that [has been] set forth on numerous 
occasions is that sheltering the guilty in many cases provides the 
only effective way of protecting the innocent. But when the privacy 
of the innocent is invaded, the Court found the right to be insignifi-
cant.112 
History as well rejects the distinction between civil and crim-
inal searches: the fourth amendment largely reflects the colonists' 
dread of the British writs of assistance, which permitted regula-
tory, not criminal, searches. 113 The sanctity of the home and of 
private property was the intended object of fourth amendment 
protection. A government agent who invades private property 
without permission imperils that sanctity, whether in the course 
of a criminal or an administrative search. 
Yet we have passed the point of no return on the path to 
multiple probable cause standards. Camara and See will never be 
overturned; Frank will never be revived. In 1979, the surest means 
of preserving the interests of subjects of administrative searches 
is to elucidate a clear, easily applied definition of the adolescent 
standard of administrative probable cause. Not until recently, 
however, have courts even begun to wrestle with the question of 
what specific evidence is necessary to demonstrate administra-
tive probable cause. The issue in most lower court cases following 
Camara and See was whether the search required a.warrant at all, 
and, if so, which probable cause standard should apply. 114 Unfor-
tunately, the Camara decision provided little, if any, guidance as 
Almost all of these exceptions arise in the criminal sphere, where emergency situa-
tions are most likely to occur. Hence, the criminal law is where fourth amendment protec-
tions have been diluted rather than expanded, contrary to what proponents of the civil-
criminal distinctions would assert. This dilution is justified, as the fourth amendment 
dictates that personal privacy should be invaded only in situations of dire emergency. 
112. Beaney, supra note 111, at 245. 
113. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51 (1937). 
114. See, e.g., Morris v. United ·states Dept. of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Ill. 
1977); Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont. 1977); Usery v. 
Centrif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga.1977); Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., 374 
F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974). 
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to what an application for an administrative search warrant must 
contain.115 
In Barlow's, the Court did elaborate on the requirements of 
administrative probable cause, but its vague guidelines were by 
way of example only: 
A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an 
OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the 
enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for 
example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries 
across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any 
of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer's 
Fourth Amendment rights. 116 
As a result of this limited guidance, lower courts have struggled 
alone to establish the standards for an administrative warrant. 
Perhaps the most informative opinion on the topic is that of 
Judge Turk in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secretary of Labor. 117 In 
Reynolds, the plaintiff plant owner moved to quash an OSHA 
inspection warrant issued by a United States magistrate contend-
ing that it contained no facts demonstrating probable cause to 
believe that specific violations existed on the premises. 118 In reply, 
the government argued that administrative probable cause re-
115. See text at notes 39-41 supra. 
116. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978). 
117. 442 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1977). 
118. The affidavit in support of the warrant presented to the magistrate included, 
inter alia, the following facts: 
1. Computer printout information at the local OSHA field office revealed that the 
plaintiffs plant had never been inspected. 
2. At the time the inspector sought the warrant, no "immediate danger situations, 
fatalities or catastrophes, complaints, or follow-up inspections" were on his 
agenda. 
3. The "Worst-First" list, data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics which 
ranks industries by frequency of accidents and injuries, was used by OSHA as a 
planning guide for general schedule inspections in order to insure that limited 
OSHA resources were most efficiently allocated to the inspection of industries 
where the likelihood of employee injury is greatest. 
4. Consultation of the "Worst-First" list revealed the plaintiffs industry to be one 
of the most hazardous, ranking twentieth on the list. 
5. Up to the time immediately prior to the application for the warrant, all but one 
of the nineteen industries preceding the plaintiffs on the "Worst-First" list had 
already been inspected by agents of the local OSHA field office (the one not in-
spected was performing government contract work for the Navy). 
6. The time, place, and scope of the inspection was specified in accordance with 
the appropriate sections of the OSH Act. 
7. The inspector agreed to make a return to the court upon completion of the 
inspection. 
442 F. Supp. at 196-97. 
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quires only a showing that the inspection "is part of a rational 
plan prepared and approved by the agency in an attempt to effec-
tuate the enforcement of the act."119 Furthermore, it offered two 
independent justifications for the warrant: (1) the mere passage 
of time between inspections, and (2) the agency's inspection plan 
that relied upon a "Worst-First" ranking of industries by safety 
records. 120 
The district court upheld the administrative warrant, relying 
most heavily upon the "Worst-First" inspection plan. 121 In dic-
tum, it mentioned other potential methods of demonstrating 
administrative probable cause, such as a "history of past viola-
tions" and "current complaints from employees regarding work 
conditions."122 The court concluded that since OSHA had pro-
posed the inspection pursuant to an apparently rational and non-
discriminatory plan, the agency had satisfied the requirements of 
administrative probable cause. 123 Thus, under the Reynolds stan-
dard, the only fundamental protection afforded by administrative 
.;: 
probable cause is :freedom from government harassment through 
arbitrary and capricious searches. 124 
On the other hand, the court in Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser 
Co. 125 found an OSHA affidavit insufficient for an administrative 
search warrant. In constrast to the detailed justifications outlined 
in Reynolds, the Weyerhaeuser affidavit stated only that an 
inspection three years earlier had uncovered a violation, which 
the firm had since corrected, and that the entire industry held an 
"occupational [hazard] rate of 19.1."126 The court found neither 
fact in the affidavit sufficient to establish administrative proba-
ble cause. Listing the industry's injury rate without more does not 
give the judge any information about how that industry ranks 
with other industries or whether the more dangerous industries 
119. 442 F. Supp. at 198. 
120. 442 F. Supp. at 200. 
121. 442 F. Supp. at 200-01. 
122. 442 F. Supp. at 200. 
123. The court's holding permits future refinement of the standard: 
Although the court notes OSHA might have selected any one of several methods to 
determine which industries and plants would be inspected, the instant plan appears 
rational and non-discriminatory, and as such is sufficient to establish probable 
cause for the inspection warrant. 
442 F. Supp. at 200 (emphasis added). 
124. 442 F. Supp. at 201. This conclusion regarding the limited protection provided 
by administrative warrants has interesting and crucial implications when applied to 
searches of the home. See text at notes 139-46 infra. 
125. 456 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1978). 
126. 456 F. Supp. at 478. 
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have already been inspected.127 The court flatly rejected the con-
tention that mere passage of time can serve as a "reasonable, 
discernible administrative standard" for probable cause. 128 Fi-
nally, the court refused to find that a violation which had been 
previously discovered and since corrected constituted probable 
cause to inspect again.129 This reasoning recognizes the inherent 
dangers of harassment and arbitrary searches that could result if 
prior violations, although corrected, could establish administra-
tive probable cause. 
Overall, defining administrative probable cause at this time 
is perhaps a futile task, as the courts only now are beginning to 
address the subject with any degree of specificity .130 The next few 
127. There is no indication of [the plant's] ranking on the list and there is no 
explanation of the hazard rate •... Above all, there is no indication of why [this 
plant], or even [this industry group], was being chosen for inspection ..•. With-
out comparable information [to the Reynolds case] in this affidavit to describe the 
administrative standards being followed, there can be no meaningful judicial review 
of the discretion being exercised by OSHA officials. Approval of a search warrant 
based on this affidavit would amount to a "rubber-stamp" such as was impliedly 
rejected by the Barlow's Court. 
456 F. Supp. at 482. 
128. 456 F. Supp. at 483. 
129. 456 F. Supp. at 482-83. 
130. The Reynolds and Weyerhaeuser decisions may actually raise more questions 
than they answer. The two cases appear to conflict: while Weyerhaeuser holds that neither 
mere passage of time nor past violations by the business are proper evidence of administra-
tive probable cause, 456 F. Supp at 482-83, Reynolds indicates that a history of past 
violations may suffice. 442 F. Supp. at 200. 
Moreover, Weyerhaeuser's wording suggests that an administrative warrant requires 
proof of a rational plan enforcing a valid regulatory statute. Yet such a requirement 
contravenes the Reynolds court's holding that administrative probable cause may be 
established without a plan by conduct of the business to be searched or evidence gained 
from informants such as employees. See 442 F. Supp. at 200. It would seem anomalous to 
hold that conduct or evidence from informants cannot establish ad1J1inistrative probable 
cause when those are the only means to establish the more stringent traditional probable 
cause. 
But if informants or past conduct can satisfy the administrative probable cause 
standard, perhaps an employee complaint that fails to reach traditional probable cause 
standards may nevertheless constitute administrative probable cause. Such a conclusion 
would require the courts to approach administrative probable cause as a less onerous but 
analogous variant of criminal probable cause and would raise numerous questions. For 
example, could an employee complaint in one department of a plant establish probable 
cause to inspect the entire facility? The resultant process of defining administrative prob-
able cause could prove as lengthy and tedious as that of defining traditional probable 
cause, a process that continues today. See text at notes 87-104 supra. 
Furthermore, Weyerhaeuser and Reynolds deal only with OSHA inspections. Courts 
have yet to analyze administrative probable cause for other government inspections. Per-
haps most importantly, the rather vague standard of administrative probable cause for 
code enforcement inspections of the home has yet to be refined. 
May 1979) Note - Administrative Searches 1315 
years should see a series of cases developing the contours of this 
emerging standard. 
C. No Warrant Required: The "Pervasively Regulated" 
Exception131 
For the "pervasively regulated" (or Colonnade-Biswell} 132 ex-
131. Exceptions to the warrant requirement have been categorized in other ways. See, 
e.g., McManis & McManis, supra note 11; Rothstein & RothsteiI_1, supra note 11; 
Administrative Search WaiTants, supra note 11. Besides the usual criminal search excep-
tions, see note 111 supra, the literature frequently mentions the open fields exception and 
the welfare search exception. However, each of these exceptions appears to exist exclu-
sively in the case that originated it: the former in Air Pollution Variance Ed. v. Western 
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 .(1974), the latter in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
132. What has become known as the "pervasively regulated" exception to the warrant 
requirement has, at various stages in its development, gone under the rubric of the 
"licensing exception," doctrine of implied consent, and finally the "pervasively regu-
lated" (or Colonnade-Biswell) exception. 
The exception finds its modern roots in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946). 
Federal agents, without a warrant, searched the defendant's gas station and determined 
that the proper number of gas coupons were not on hand. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the conviction on the grounds that, since the coupons were government property and not 
private documents, the defendant was only the custodian of government property (the 
coupons) and had to consent to the search. 
The licensing exception bloomed in Peeples v. United States, 341 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 988 (1965), which upheld the warrantless search of a federally 
licensed liquor dealer on the grounds that fourth amendment proscriptions do not apply 
as stringently where the search consists of an inspection of public documents that the 
federal licensee is required to keep. Many courts agreed, sanctioning warrantless searches 
"merely because the subject of a search was a licensee." Beyond the Fourth Amendment, 
supra note 11, at 96. 
The weakness of the licensing exception was dramatized in United States v. Hart, 
359 F. Supp. 835 (D. Del. 1973). In that case, the defendant gun dealer was convicted of 
a violation of federal gun control Jaws and, as a result, lost his license. Before going to 
prison, the defendant attempted to liquidate his remaining stock of weapons through an 
advertised sale. A federal agent noticed the advertisement and conducted a warrantless 
search of the defendant's premises. The district court granted the defendant's motion to 
suppress, holding that the warrantless exception applied only to licensed dealers. Since 
the defendant's license had been revoked, the government could no longer search the 
dealership without a warrant, even though the defendant was conductmg an advertised 
sale of firearms after revocation of his license. Evidently, those dealers who have lost their 
license merit greater protection than those who have acted lawfully! 
The court had earlier noted this mconsistency m United States v. Del Campo Baking 
Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972), by upholding a warrantless FDA inspection 
even though the FDA did not have licensing procedures. The test for reasonableness of 
the search examined the statutorily authorized degree of regulation over the particular 
industry; it was not dependent upon the presence or absence of a piece of paper called a 
license. 345 F. Supp. at 1377. Except for a few aberrant cases such as Hart, Del Campo 
signalled the demise of the licensing exception rationale. 
Some courts relied on implied consent to justify warrantless inspections of regulated 
commercial enterprises. This approach was especially popular among state courts that 
upheld wamintless inspections enforcmg state regulatory and licensmg schemes. See, e.g., 
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ception to apply, three conditions must be met: (1) the enterprise 
in question must be engaged in a "pervasively regulated busi-
ness"; (2) warrantless inspection must be necessary to further an 
"urgent federal interest" expressed in authorizing legislation; and 
(3) that legislation must limit the time, place, and scope of au-
thorized inspections.133 The definition of what industries fall 
within the "peryasively regulated" exception remains vague, but 
as previously noted, courts have so characterized several indus-
tries. 134 In each of these industries the regulating statute ad-
dresses a fairly discrete, definable segment of commerce and is 
not applicable to business in interstate commerce generally.'35 
The exception has been a target of scholarly criticism. Some 
claim that the exception is unnecessary and illogical. Since an 
administrative warrant is relatively easy to obtain and typically 
may be acquired through an ex parte hearing, the inspecting 
officer really has "no excuse for not obtaining one as a matter of 
Daley v. Berzanskis, 47 Ill. 2d 395, 269 N.E. 2d 716 (1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 
(1971); Lanchester v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commn., 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 
85, 325 A.2d 648 (1974); Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669 (1971). 
The merchant, it was argued, by voluntarily entering into a regulated form of business, 
impliedly had waived most if not all privacy rights in its operation. See Harkey v. deWet• 
ter, 443 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal 
Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973). 
Although one commentator suggests that the Colonnade and Biswell decisions and 
their progeny can be explained in terms of the implied consent doctrine, Beyond the 
Fourth Amendment, supra I}ote 11, at 105, the cases more accurately reflect a refinement 
of the "pervasively regulated" exception: 
Prior to Biswell, the validity of an administrative search was often resolved by 
reference to an "implied consent" theory: by entering the business, the citizen was 
presumed to have consented to governmental intrusions. "Implied consent" is, of 
course, a fiction, a catchphrase with no real content; the courts imply a consent to 
search which was never in fact given. Biswell applied a different analysis: where a 
dealer is provided in advance with detailed information concerning his obligations 
and the government's inspection powers, the inspection program presents only a 
"limited" threat to the dealer's "justifiable expectations of privacy." This reason• 
ing is more responsive to the fourth amendment concerns under a balancing theory 
than the "implied consent" rationale. 
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 1025-26 (footnotes omitted). 
133. McAdams & Miljas, OSHA and Wa"antless Inspections, 29 LABOR L.J. 49, 54 
(1978). Several other requirements for the Colonnade-Biswell exception have been de-
tailed by courts and commentators, but the basic interests involved are the same in all of 
them. See generally Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont. 1977); 
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 50 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Com-
ment, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Are Wa"antless Routine OSHA Inspections a Violation 
of the Fourth Amendment?, 6 ENVTL. A.FF., 423, 432-33 (1978). 
134. See notes 69-71 supra and accompanying text. 
135. Cases indicate that warrantless searches are authorized only where a particular 
industry is the subject of regulatory statutes. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 
627 (D.N.M. 1976); Brennan v. Gibson's Prods., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976). 
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course or at least as a safety precaution when other validation 
factors such as consent are questionable."136 Moreover, no factors 
peculiar to pervasively regulated industries demand such unique 
treatment. It is difficult to see why an agent of the Division of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms need not obtain a warrant to 
inspect a registered alcohol dealer, but an agent of the Federal 
Drug Enforcement Agency must do so to inspect a registered 
pharmacy. The fourth amendment appears neither to contain nor 
to condone such fine, indeed arbitrary, distinctions. 
One especially troubling aspect of the "pervasively regu-
lated" exception is the Court's contention in Biswell that Con-
gress's expression of an urgent federal interest in the authorizing 
statute may justify an exception to the fourth amendment war-
rant requirement.137 The reasoning behind this argument threat-
ens the entire fabric of the fourth amendment: 
The obvious implication is that it is within the discretion of Con-
gress to apply or not apply the fourth amendment, a postulate 
wholly inconsistent with the balance of interests theory of Camara-
See and Terry. Once there is a governmental intrusion the fourth 
amendment "applies"; a fourth amendment issue has at least been 
raised, and the proper inquiry is how it is to be resolved considering 
governmental needs and the protections due the citizens.138 
136. United States v. Pugh, 417 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (W.D. Mich. 1976). 
137. 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972). 
138. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 1018-19. The compelling interest argument for 
warrantless municipal code inspections of private dwellings has also been attacked: 
When the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches, it, of course, by implica-
tion, permits reasonable searches. But reasonableness without a warrant is ad-
judged solely by the extremity of the circumstances of the moment and not by any 
general characteristic of the officer or his mission. If an officer is pursuing a felon 
who runs into a house and hides, the officer may follow and arrest him. But this is 
because under the exigencies of circumstances the law of pursuit supersedes the rule 
as to search. There is no doctrine that search for garbage is reasonable while search 
for arms, stolen goods or gambling equipment is not. Moreover, except for the most 
urgent of necessities, the question of reasonableness is for a magistrate and not the 
enforcement officer. 
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd. on other grounds, 
339 U.S. 1 (1950) (emphasis added). 
The interpretation of the fourth amendment in Little is an exceedingly literal one, 
reminiscent of the stance taken by the majority in Frank v. Maryland and the dissenters 
in See and Barlow's. Such an interpretation would require administrative authorities to 
find means other than area and periodic inspections of private dwellings to enforce code 
provisions. It would permit warrantless searches only where emergency conditions pre-
clude obtaining a warrant; it would reject the Camara-See argument that requirement of 
a traditional probable cause warrant would frustrate enforcement. Although this interpre-
tation may be an artifact that has been effectively displaced by subsequent decisions, the 
argument remains persuasive. Citizens' constitutional privacy interests should not suffer 
because they impede law enforcement. The former are clearly paramount. Rather, the 
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The danger of this exception is that it sees only the govern-
ment's interest in the search and not the threatened privacy of 
the subject of the search. This myopia contributed to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Wyman v. James139 where the Court 
allowed a warrantless administrative inspection of a welfare re-
cipient's home. The appellee, an Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children recipient, refused to permit a caseworker to enter her 
home even after several days' advance notice of the visit. The 
New York aid program required home visits by caseworkers as a 
condition for continued assistance.140 Threatened with loss of her 
benefits, James sought injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing 
that such visits, lacking consent or a warrant supported by proba-
ble cause, violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 141 
Although a three-judge district court panel allowed James's 
claim, the Supreme Court reversed and upheld the state visita-
tion program.142 The Court's two-pronged opinion first suggested 
that the visitation program was not a fourth amendment search 
at all, noting that the state neither "forced" nor "compelled" the 
search and that there were no criminal sanctions for refusal to 
submit; if the recipient had withheld consent, there would have 
been no search.143 That argument is hardly overwhelming. 144 
Perhaps sensing the weakness of its first contention, the 
Court introduced a second argument, one more interesting for the 
purpose of this Note: Even if the visits were fourth amendment 
searches, they were reasonable ones and required no warrant. The 
Court reasoned analogously to Colonnade and Biswell, holding 
solution lies in more thoughtful and innovative drafting of legislation with new, constitu-
tionally legitimate ways to enforce such code provisions. See note 174 infra. 
139. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
140. 400 U.S. at 311-12 & nn. 2-4. 
141. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
142. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971). 
143. 400 U.S. at 317. 
144. It is difficult to believe that such a visitation could not be considered a fourth 
amendment search. A government worker entered the home to see that the parent pro-
vided a suitable environment for the child and that welfare benefits were not misused. 
The intrusion necessary to determine those facts can hardly be minimal. Moreover, the 
assertion that the beneficiary has the right to refuse the visit without threat of government 
sanctions is both inaccurate and naive. The welfare recipient has no greater freedom to 
refuse the visit and forfeit future benefits than a businessman has to refuse entry to OSHA 
inspectors and shut down his business. In both situations, economic realities remove all 
elements of choice. This is especially true for the welfare recipient, who presumably 
applies for benefits out of necessity and must be practically destitute to qualify. Further, 
to deny a child support funds because of a mother's refusal to consent to a visit is contrary 
to the goals of the aid program. 
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that warrantless searches were the only effective way to carry out 
the statutory purpose, and that the public's enforcement interest 
outweighed James's privacy interest. 145 This argument, too, has 
faced considerable criticism, 146 as it inherits many of the faults 
inherent in the Colonnade-Biswell exception. The majority opin-
ion appears to have cast aside fourth amendment guarantees 
merely because an "urgent federal interest" was at stake. But 
surely federal or state government may not remove a search from 
the purview of the fourth amendment simply by labeling it 
"urgent." Second, in asserting that a welfare search is less intru-
sive than a criminal one, the Court reverted to the ill-conceived 
distinction between civil and criminal searches that it rejected in 
Camara and See. Noncriminal searches triggered fourth amend-
ment protection in those cases; home investigations by a welfare 
caseworker in Wyman, however, did not. 
Regrettably, the Wyman Court too easily extended the 
"pervasively regulated" exception from businesses into the 
home. Although the government's interest arguably may be as 
important in Wyman as in Colonnade or Biswell, the privacy 
interests of the subject of the search are quite different. Yet by 
emphasizing the government's, and not the citizen's interests, 
the Court denied warrant protection in both situations. 
Thus, basic difficulties remain in the Supreme Court's ad-
ministrative search decisions. Establishing administrative proba-
ble cause in Camara, the Court inadequately anticipated several 
inconsistencies of a dual fourth amendment standard. Deficien-
cies in fourth amendment protection, most notably those caused 
by the "pervasively regulated" exception, will persist under any 
approach that weighs the government's enforcement interest 
more heavily than the citizen's privacy interest. Most disturb-
ingly, however, the Wyman Court permitted a variant of that 
exception to creep into a private residence, denying the home 
fourth amendment protection that was deemed so vital in 
Camara and See. 
145. The principal argument is threefold. First, the Court used a public trust ration-
ale: The government, in fulfilling an important social goal, should have the power to see 
that the allocated public funds are spent properly by the recipient. See 400 U.S. at 318-
19. Second, the Court distinguished the visit on the grounds that it was not a criminal 
type of search. 400 U.S. at 321-23. Finally, the Court asserted that a warrant requirement, 
to allow efficient enforcement, would have to be so diluted that it would provide little or 
no protection. 400 U.S. at 323-24. 
146. See, e.g., Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact 
of Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1259 (1971); 85 HARv. L. REV. 258 (1971); 24 VAND. 
L. REV. 821 (1971). 
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III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS: A 
COMMERCIAL-PRIVATE DWELLING DISTINCTION 
Whatever the merits or demerits of the administrative proba-
ble cause standard, it is apt to remain. A dramatic shift in the 
Supreme Court's thinking, aligning with the dissents' rationale in 
See and Barlow's, seems unlikely. Therefore, the real issue is not 
whether a dual standard of probable cause should exist, but to 
what situations the administrative standard, as opposed to tradi-
tional probable cause, should apply. 
While commentators suggest several solutions, 147 the Su-
preme Court has taken an ad hoc approach - determining 
whether a warrant is necessary for each inspection program as 
cases arise, formulating exceptions as needed. Yet, because 
fourth amendment protections are vital, 148 some coherent doc-
trine of government searches should be developed. Such a coher-
ent doctrine needs a reference point - a focus around which new 
refinements may reliably and consistently revolve. It has become 
clear that the Camara-See balancing approach fails to provide 
that reference point: the decisions have been unpredictable and 
inequitable. And yet a workable reference point has already been 
at least implicitly suggested. 149 In fact, it practically leaps out of 
the fourth amendment. The fulcrum over which the choice be-
tween standards should balance is the potential intrusiveness of 
147. Among the better suggestions is LaFave's proposed dual requirements of notice 
and adversary proceedings before instigation of the inspection. See note 98 supra. Most 
likely, the Court has not taken this approach because it could undercut code enforcement 
in many areas where surprise checks are vital to ensure compliance. See, e.g., See v. City 
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 n.6 (1967); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). 
Another proposal would require administrative probable cause for "routine" searches 
and traditional probable cause for "non-routine" searches. Administatiue Search War-
ants, supra note 11, at 641-43. A routine inspection is described as one that is part of "a 
systematic program of inspection [that] naturally includes the property in question." Id. 
at 641. Thus, a nonroutine inspection is one that is directed at a particular citizen or 
business upon suspicion of a violation. The author concludes that "when an inspection 
begins to approximate a traditional criminal investigation a warrant should never be 
issued in the absence of traditional probable cause." Id. at 642. 
Beyond the obvious problems for judges in refining this proposal's distinction for 
application to borderline cases, the separation of routine and nonroutine searches suffers 
from the same pitfalls as the civil-criminal distinction. While not based upon the threat 
of potential criminal liability, the proposal still provides warrant protection for those 
particular individuals who are suspected of civil violations (by definition, these are sub-
jects ofnonroutine inspections) while providing no warrant protection for those suspected 
of no violations (the subjects of routine searches). The weaknesses of such an approach 
are discussed at notes 21, 37, and 111 supra. 
148. See notes 79 & 87 supra. 
149. See Administrative Search Wa"ants, supra note 11, at 621. 
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the search. The doctrine chosen must provide different levels of 
probable cause that principally reflect not the urgency of the 
government interest to be advanced, but rather the threat to 
citizens' privacy. 
Traditional probable cause secures the right to privacy in its 
broadest sense: the right to be free from any government intrusion 
unless there is reason to suspect a violation of the law on the 
premises.150 Traditional probable cause thus can be seen as a 
device that guards the "indefeasible right to personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property."151 The interest was proba-
bly best described by Justice Brandeis: "the right to be let alone 
... the right most valued by civilized men."152 
Administrative probable cause, in contrast, provides little 
protection for privacy in that traditional sense.153 It does, how-
ever, supply a significant measure of fourth amendment protec-
tion. The magistrate in an administrative probable cause hearing 
reduces the threat that administrative inspections, through arbi-
trary or discriminatory application, will become a tool for harass-
ment.154 Thus, although administrative probable cause may be 
established without suspicion of a specific violation, it protects 
the citizen's privacy from the capricious whim of the inspector. 
So how is a court to know when a privacy interest is strong 
enough to justify the more stringent traditional standard, and 
when it is only strong enough to justify the weaker administrative 
standard? This Note contends that the answer lies in the most 
fundamental societal structure of privacy: the home. 
A. Searches and Inspections of the Home: Traditional Probable 
Cause 
If in one place a citizen's privacy interest is overpowering, it 
is in the home.155 In an era of pervasive government regulation 
150. See text at notes 88-94 supra. 
151. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
152. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
153. See Administrative Search Warrants, supra note 11, at 643; LaFave, supra note 
11, at 37. 
154. See text at note 84 supra. 
155. In Wyman v. James, the Court observed: 
When a case involves a home and some type of official intrusion into that home 
. . . an immediate and natural reaction is one of concern about Fourth Amendment 
rights and the protection which that Amendment is intended to afford. Its emphasis 
indeed is upon one of the most precious aspects of personal security in the 
home. . . . And over the years the Court has consistently been most protective of 
the privacy of the dwelling. 
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and control, the home stands as the last enclave against govern-
mental scrutiny: 
The values of the home protected by the Fourth Amendment are 
not peculiar to capitalism as we have known it; they are equally 
relevant to the new form of socialism which we are entering. More-
over, as the numbers of functionaries and inspectors multiply, the 
need for protection of the individual becomes indeed more essen-
tial if the values of a free society are to remain. 
The bureaucracy of modern government is not only slow, 
lumbering, and oppressive; it is omnipresent. It touches everyone's 
life at numerous points. It pries more and more into private affairs, 
breaking down the barriers that individuals erect to give them 
some insulation from the intrigues and harassment of modern life. 
Isolation is not a constitutional guarantee; but the sanctity of the 
sanctuary of the home is such . . . , 156 
The Supreme Court's treatment of pornography and its use 
in the home reflects that sanctity. In Stanley u. Georgia, 167 the 
defendant appealed a conviction for possession of obscene mate-
rial that police had found in his bedroom under authority of a 
warrant. Although the Court struck down the statute primarily 
400 U.S. at"316. This unique sanctity of the home has roots almost as old as civilization: 
The peculiar immunity that the law has thrown around the dwelling house of man, 
pithily expressed in the maxim, "a man's house is his castle," was not an invention 
of English jurisprudence. Even in ancient times there were evidences of that same 
concept in custom and law, partly as a result of the natural desire for privacy, partly 
an outgrowth, in all probability, of the emphasis placed by the ancients upon the 
home as a place of hospitality, shelter, and protection. 
N. LAssoN, supra note 113, at 13. Based upon this firm historical foundation, the English 
common law bestowed greater protection upon the "sanctity of an individual's home" 
than it did to the "privacy of his person." Beaney, supra note 111, at 235. The privacy 
interest in the home is nowhere better illustrated than in the famous words of William 
Pitt before Parliament in 1766: 
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It 
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may 
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares 
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 
Quoted in N. LASSON, supra note 113, at 49-50. 
The principle of the home as a haven from government intrusion travelled across the 
Atlantic and is now embedded in American jurisprudence. Indeed, the sanctity of the 
home has been described as a "core value" of the fourth amendment: 
The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long 
history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). It was in part that right to privacy 
in the home which led the Supreme Court to support the marital privacy right in the 
contraceptive cases. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
156. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 335 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis original) 
(footnote omitted). 
157. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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on first amendment grounds, the decision stressed that the search 
took place in the home: 
[The appellant] is asserting the right to read or observe what he 
pleases - the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs 
in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free 
from state inquiry into the contents of his library .... Whatever 
may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, 
we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. 15H 
Privacy in the home holds paramount respect in criminal 
search cases, 159 and courts narrowly construe statutes that author-
ize home searches. In United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 160 for 
example, police discovered heroin during a warrantless search of 
a federal probationer's residence. One condition of her probation 
required that she submit to a search of her person or property at 
any time. The government argued that the Federal Probation Act 
of 1948161 authorized such a condition. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, refused to interpret the Act so broadly, invalidating the 
condition on the grounds that the Act did not authorize searches 
that failed to meet fourth amendment standards.162 No federal 
statute could force the probationer to surrender her right of pri-
vacy in the home as a condition for release. 
Courts respect the home privacy interest for administrative 
searches as well. In District of Columbia v. Little, 163. the defen-
dant was convicted of interfering with a health inspector's duties 
158. 394 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). The Court also stated: 
Moreover, in the context of this case - a prosecution for mere possession of printed 
or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own home - that right [to receive 
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth] takes on an added dimen-
sion. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circuiµstan-
ces, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy. 
394 U.S. at 564. 
This implied "added dimension" has definite fourth amendment overtones. Although 
the Court's opinion relied primarily on the first amendment, it did not deny a possible 
fourth amendment violation; it simply did not reach the issue, although the opinion 
certainly borrows from fourth amendment rationale. Indeed, three Justices concurred in 
a separate opinion and specifically found a fourth amendment violation. 394 U.S. at 572. 
Had the search been warrantless or based upon less than traditional probable cause, it 
seems likely the entire Court would have reached that conclusion. 
159. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 
269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
160. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). But see Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975) (warrantless search of parolee's house by parole officers, 
as opposed to law enforcement officers in Consuelo-Gonzalez, upheld). 
161. 18 u.s.c. § 3651 (1976). 
162. 521 F.2d at 262. 
163. 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd. on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). See also 
Currier v. City of Pasadena, 48 Cal. App. 3d 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1975). 
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after she refused to unlock her door at his command. The inspec-
tor had no warrant. The District of Columbia Circuit overturned 
the conviction, holding that the fourth amendment protected her 
from a warrantless search. Privacy in the home was a critical 
concern: 
Even for the most important laws and even for the wisest and most 
benign officials, a search warrant must be had. 
We emphasize that no matter who the officer is or what his 
mission, a government official cannot invade a private home, un-
less (1) a magistrate has authorized him to do so or (2) an immedi-
ate major crisis in the performance of duty affords neither time nor 
opportunity to apply to a magistrate. This right of privacy is not 
conditioned upon the objective, the prerogative or the stature of 
the intruding officer. His uniform, badge, rank and the bureau 
from which he operates are immaterial. It is immaterial whether 
he is motivated by the highest public purpose or by the lowest 
personal spite.16' 
The second Justice Harlan reached a similar conclusion about 
governmental searches of any kind involving the home: 
I think the sweep of the Court's decisions, under both the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, amply shows that the Constitution 
protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion 
of whatever character.165 
This significant privacy interest demands greater protection 
than the ex parte administrative probable cause standard of 
164. 178 F.2d at 17. 
165. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). In Poe, the Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute 
prohibiting the use or the dispensing of information about birth control devices because 
of lack of justiciability: the statute was seldom, if ever, enforced and the complainants 
were seeking declaratory judgment on a statute which the Court saw no rensonnble proba-
bility of ever being prosecuted. The same statute was successfully attacked Inter in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
Justice Harlan's dissent is also noteworthy because of its discussion of the unique 
nature of privacy in the home and how it may be threatened by the birth control statute: 
[H]ere we have not an intrusion into the home so much as on the life which 
characteristically has its place in the home. But to my mind such a distinction is 
so insubstantial as to be captious: if the physical curtilage of the home is protected, 
it is surely as a result of solicitude to protect the privacies of life within. Certainly 
the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property 
rights. 
367 U.S. at 551-52 (emphasis added). 
This imal statement - that the privacy of the home is based upon more than property 
rights - supports the theory that the privacy interests surrounding the home are somehow 
different than the more property-oriented privacy interests of the business enterprise, See 
text at notes 179-83 infra. 
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Camara and See. 166 Some argue that an administrative search is 
less intrusive upon personal privacy than a criminal search.167 But 
rationalizing that there is a lesser invasion of privacy in an 
inspection for electrical, fire, sanitation, or welfare violations 
than in a search for criminal evidence constitutes a very arbitrary 
definition of the right to privacy in the home.168 Under the present 
standard, the suspected criminal's home receives a greater degree 
of protection than that of the citizen with falling ceiling tile.169 
The only way to ensure privacy in the home is to require that 
warrants for home inspections be issued only upon showing of 
traditional probable cause. 
Opponents of this stringent probable cause standard may 
argue that its use would emasculate municipal code enforce-
ment.170 However, rational study of the problem alleviates many 
fears. First, voluntary consent removes the need for traditional 
probable cause, and occupants usually consent if the inspector is 
not unreasonable. 171 The relative dearth of administrative war-
rant cases involving home searches, compared with the multitude 
involving commercial searches, supports this contention. In addi-
tion, most municipal health and safety inspections benefit princi-
pally the owners or occupants; they are the persons most likely 
to suffer because of dangerous conditions within the dwelling. 
Accordingly, the occupant's opposition to an inspection weakens 
its justification. 
Moreover, to the extent that traditional probable cause inter-
feres with code enforcement, analogies to other areas of the law 
exist. We do not practice preventive criminal law enforcement by 
searching people at random to uncover evidence of an impending 
criminal act; 172 rather, our constitutional system demands a 
trade-off between universal law enforcement and civil liberties. 
Likewise, the government does not compel the use of safety 
belts in cars or forbid the smoking of cigarettes even though a 
citizen's decision in these matters may be foolhardy. We tolerate 
these situations because the values of privacy and independence 
outweigh the suffering that may result from an individual's un-
166. See Administrative Search Wa"ants, supra note 11, at 643; LaFave, supra note 
11, at 37. 
167. LaFave, supra note 11, at 19. 
168. See note 109 supra. 
169. See note 111 supra. 
170. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967). 
171. See 387 U.S. at 539. 
172. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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wise decision. Such should be our valuation of a citizen's right to 
the utmost privacy in his home. 173 
Although dangerous conditions in one house or apartment 
could harm surrounding neighbors, those concerns do not justify 
a lower standard of probable cause. If the fears of neighbors or 
fellow tenants are aroused by evidence of a code violation, they 
can report their observations and suspicions to appropriate au-
thorities. If the evidence is convincing, it will provide traditional 
probable cause for a warrant. If, on the other hand, there is no 
outwardly observable code violation and the resident does not 
wish a government official to enter his home, the resident should 
be able to refuse entry. Administrative authorities must devise 
alternative, less intrusive means to enforce a statute. 174 The right 
to be left alone warrants that respect. 
173. See Note, supra note 111, at 180-83. 
174. Such alternatives are available. For instance, one of the greatest concerns with 
requiring traditional probable cause for code inspections of dwellings is the impracticality 
of enforcement in multiple-unit dwellings. The worry is well-founded, as violations in 
multiple-unit dwellings present a hazard to large numbers of people who may be totally 
ignorant of their neighbors' violations. 
A solution that satisfies the commercial-private dwelling distinction is possible. Sev-
eral cities already have ordinances that require the owner of a building to have the 
premises inspected before he sells the structure or before he rents it to a new tenant. See 
Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 138,346 N.E.2d 666 (1976); Loventhal v. City 
of Mt. Vernon, 51 App. Div. 2d 732, 379 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1976). 
Such statutes can reconcile meaningful apartment house inspections and the tradi-
tional probable cause requirement. For example, a city ordinance could require all land-
lords or owners of residential units to allow a general code inspection of the premises and 
to obtain a certificate of inspection as a prerequisite to the sale or leasing of any unit. The 
city authorities would have the power to conduct an inspection prior to granting the 
certificate if deemed necessary. 
The certificate inspection would require a warrant based upon administrative, and 
not traditional, probable cause. The landlord would apply for the certificate after the 
previous tenant had vacated the premises. The code enforcement authorities, in turn, 
would be required to obtain the warrant and, if an inspection were determined to be 
necessary, inspect within a few days after the landlord gave notice of vacancy. If the 
authorities failed to inspect within this period, the certificate would be automatically 
granted, and the landlord could rent the premises. 
Note that this arrangement does not offend the traditional probable cause require-
ment for the home. When an apartment or house is vacant between tenants, it is essen-
tially the landlord's commercial property rather than a private dwelling. During that 
period, the structure could be inspected with a warrant based on administrative probable 
cause. Yet, at the same time, such an arrangement would ensure that the opportunity to 
inspect the dwelling exists at least as often as the apartment changes hands. It is unclear 
whether this scheme would permit an apartment to be inspected more or less often than 
under present random spot inspection plans, but it does provide greater protection of 
privacy than the spot checks while supplying a comparable level of enforcement. It also 
provides an additional incentive for the landlord to repair the rental unit for the next 
tenant. 
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B. Searches and Inspections of Commercial Premises: 
Administrative Probable Cause 
Searches and inspections of business operations stand on a 
different footing than those conducted in the home. While it is 
undeniably true that businesses and corporations are entitled to 
fourth amendment protection, 175 it does not necessarily follow 
that they deserve the same protection as private dwellings. 
Even while extending fourth amendment protections to com-
mercial enterprises in See, the Court recognized that more lenient 
requirements for inspection were appropriate in the business 
setting: 
We do not in any way imply that business premises may not rea-
sonably be inspected in many more situations than private homes, 
nor do we question such accepted regulatory techniques as licens-
ing programs which require inspections prior to operating a busi-
ness or marketing a product .... We hold only that the basic 
component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment 
- that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure -
is applicable in this context, as in others, to business as well as to 
residential premises.178 
This distinction is not only intuitively attractive; it also has con-
siderable precedent supporting it. Corporations historically have 
been subject to broad state visitorial power. 177 As creatures of the 
state, they are not entitled to all constitutional protections 
granted to private individuals. 178 
175. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 
541 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); United 
States v. Habig, 474 F.2d 57 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); In re Lukich, 
335 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
176. 387 U.S. at 545-46. In footnote 6 of See, the Court laid further groundwork for 
the idea that the treatment of businesses and private homes under the fourth amendment 
was not intended to be identical: 
We do not decide whether warrants to inspect business premises may be issued only 
after access is refused [as argued in the Camara decision]; since surprise may often 
be a crucial aspect of routine inspections of business establishments, the reasona-
bleness of warrants issued in advance of inspection will necessarily vary with the 
nature of the regulation involved and may differ from standards applicable to 
private homes. 
387 U.S. at 545 n.6. 
177. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204 (1946). 
178. 327 U.S. at 205. The distinction has been recognized elsewhere as well. In United 
States v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 375 F. Supp. 962, 967 (D. Kan. 1974), the court flatly 
stated that "[c]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of 
[the] right to privacy." In GM Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977), 
tpe Court recognized that "business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may 
open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context." 
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A broader justification, however, for more lenient search re-
quirements for commercial property lies in the balancing test first 
presented in Camara. In a business search, the government en-
forcement interest frequently weighs more heavily than in the 
search of a private dwelling, but the privacy interest of a business 
is considerably less than that of an individual home. A critical 
analysis of the Court's argument in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 
supporting fourth amendment protection for businesses reveals 
the reason for that distinction. 
Justice White's majority opinion in Barlow's states that busi-
nesses deserve fourth amendment protection because one of the 
evils that amendment sought to eliminate was the oppressive in-
spection of colonial merchants' premises.179 History does indeed 
support fourth amendment protection for businesses, but it does 
not indicate that they are on an equal plane with private dwel-
lings. Merchants and businessmen in colonial times typically 
operated sole proprietorships, and the business shop frequently 
lay adjacent to the living quarters.180 The modern business 
concern, in contrast, is a large amalgamation of people and ma-
chinery that may itself be a separate legal entity. Moreover, a 
modern business may employ hundreds or thousands of workers 
and distribute products to be purchased by thousands of people 
over a large geographical area.181 No longer is the conduct of a 
business the private concern of a single proprietor. 182 The health 
and safety interests of a business's many customers and employ-
179. 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978). 
180. See A. CoNARD, R. KNAUSS, & S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 1 (2d ed. 
1977). The corporate form of commercial enterprise was virtually unknown in colonial 
times. Id. at 604. 
181. See generally United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141, 143 
(N.D. Okla. 1973). 
182. Of course, that argument could lead to the conclusion that sole proprietorships 
should, like the home, be given the protection of the traditional probable cause require-
ment. However, the results of such a distinction could be arbitrary: Very small corpora-
tions would receive less protection than a large sole proprietorship solely because of the 
management's choice of business organization. It would also mean that courts would have 
to determine when a business affects the interests of enough consumers and employees to 
justify imposition of the administrative probable cause. As stated earlier, there is need 
for a bright line distinction between traditional and administrative probable cause, To 
that end, searches of commercial enterprise should require only administrative probable 
cause, regardless of the form of business organization, and private dwellings should receive 
the protection of traditional probable cause. Although even this classification is not with-
out borderline cases, see, e.g., United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337 (E,D. Pa. 
1972), affd., 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973), it appears clearer than one based upon the 
substantiality of a business's operations and the number of people affected. 
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ees severely dilute its own privacy interest.183 Thus, the govern-
ment interests advanced by health and safety inspections of a 
business are great, and the privacy interest impinged is corre-
spondingly slight. This balance contrasts starkly with the inter-
ests of a private home. 
This is not, of course, an argument that businesses lie beyond 
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. Rather, all busi-
nesses should have the protection that a nonpervasively regulated 
industry now enjoys - that of an administrative probable cause 
test.184 Necessary to this resolution, then, is the elimination of the 
"pervasively regulated" exception to the warrant requirement.185 
A strong argument for this conclusion emerges from an examina-
tion of how courts have distinguished OSHA inspections from the 
183. Privacy interests may be limited in a public setting where the rights and welfare 
of other citizens are directly involved. In Public Utils. Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 
(1952), disgruntled bus passengers sued the District of Columbia public utilities commis-
sion, alleging that radio programs broadcast on the buses invaded rights of privacy secured 
under the first and fifth amendments. (No fourth amendment issue was present as no 
search or seizure was involved.) The Commission had determined that the majority of the 
passengers favored the service. The Supreme Court held for the Commission, stating: 
This position [of the complainants] wrongly assumes that the Fifth Amendment 
secures to each passenger on a public vehicle regulated by the Federal Government 
a right of privacy to which he is entitled in his own home. However complete his 
right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others 
when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare .or rides in a public conveyance. 
343 U.S. at 464. The Pollak decision, though dealing with a public area, has implications 
for businesses as well. The Court lessened an individual's privacy interest as that individ-
ual left the haven of the home and ventured into the public. The same outcome probably 
would have resulted in Pollak had the bus been privately owned. 
This analysis was confirmed in Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973), 
where the Court upheld an injunction shutting down an adult theater even though there 
was no evidence that minors had been illegally admitted. The theater owners relied on 
the privacy arguments of the Stanley case, see text at notes 157-58 supra, but the Court 
distinguished that case on the grounds that Stanley involved the presence of obscene films 
in the home while Paris Adult Theatre I involved obscene films shown publicly by a 
commercial enterprise. The Court recognized what might be termed a zone of privacy 
around the home, implicitly limiting the privacy interest of a commercial enterprise. 
184. For the commercial establishment, this is no illusory protection. Although the 
administrative probable cause standard does not afford the privacy protection of tradi-
tional probable cause, it has at least four definite advantages over warrantless searches: 
(1) It interposes an independent magistrate between the government inspector and the 
business firm, assuring that the search is neither arbitrary nor capricious. (2) The magis-
trate ensures that the inspection is properly limited in time, place, and scope, eliminating 
the unbridled discretion of the inspector. (3) The warrant notifies the business of the 
statutory limits of the search. (4) It identifies the facts presented to justify the search, in 
case the business later wants to question the validity of the warrant in court. See note 84 
supra. 
185. The Court's use of the Colonnade-Biswell exception recognizes this Note's sug-
gested distinction between commercial facilities and private dwellings. The exception, 
however, goes too far, abusing fourth amendment guarantees. 
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Colonnade-Biswell exception. 
Since the "pervasively regulated" exception applies only to 
statutes regulating a single industry, courts have refused to apply 
it to OSHA because OSHA covers practically all of American 
industry. 186 This argument wilts under scrutiny. If a primary basis 
for the "pervasively regulated" exception is an urgent federal in-
terest in the authorizing statute, Congress could hardly express 
a more urgent interest than it did in OSHA. 187 Indeed, the interest 
that OSHA protects arguably benefits many more people (the 
whole of the American work force) than the narrower liquor, gun, 
or coal mine laws that the exception has embraced.188 Assuming 
that a compelling interest justifies suspension of fourth amend-
ment requirements in certain industries, a similar suspension cer-
tainly should follow when a broader statute states an even more 
compelling interest.189 The point is not that OSHA should be 
included in the "pervasively regulated" exception, but rather 
that the exception itself is unsound. 
Furthermore, there is little cause for fear that requiring ad-
ministrative warrants for inspections of pervasively regulated 
industries will unduly frustrate enforcement. The issuance of 
administrative warrants based on ex parte hearings will not upset 
the surprise necessary for such searches, but it will afford the 
subject of the inspection a degree of fourth amendment protec-
tion.190 
186. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enter• 
prises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D.N.M. 1976); Brennan v. Gibson's Prods., Inc., 407 F, 
Supp. 154, 160 (E.D. Tex. 1976). 
187. The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work 
situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate 
commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability 
compensation payments. 
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the exercise of 
its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations 
and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working 
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to pre• 
serve our human resources • . . • 
29 U.S.C. § 651(a) & (b) (1976). 
188. The liquor industry may perhaps be a valid exception, due not so much to its 
long history of regulation as to its unique constitutional treatment in the twenty.first 
amendment. 
189. In addition, the privacy interests at stake in an OSHA search may be less 
significant than in a search of a pervasively regulated business. One commentator argues 
that subjects of OSHA inspections, which take place in a semi-public work area, have a 
lesser "justifiable expectation of privacy" than pervasively regulated businesses have in 
locked storeroom areas. Comment, supra note 133, at 438. 
190. See note 184 supra. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The changes that this Note proposes for the theory of fourth 
amendment protection are in no way radical, but they would 
better protect the privacy of people and businesses without un-
duly hampering enforcement of government safety regulations. 
First, administrative searches of private dwellings should be re-
moved from the administrative probable cause standard and 
placed under the traditional probable cause standard, which now 
covers no administrative searches. In particular, the warrantless 
welfare inspection of Wyman should be discarded, and welfare 
searches should require traditional probable cause since they in-
vade the home. Furthermore, the "pervasively regulated" ex-
ception should end, and those industries it previously embraced 
should receive the benefit of the administrative probable cause 
standard. 
This new analysis of administrative searches offers some de-
gree of order and predictability in an area of constitutional law 
that has been uncertain for several years. It also has the advan-
tage of fitting fairly well into existing case law.191 Most impor-
tantly, it rationally resolves the central problem of administrative 
searches: balancing the government's enforcement interest 
against a citizen's underestimated right to be left alone. 
191. The only cases that fail to fit into the scheme are Colonnade, Biswell, and 
Wyman, all of which were incorrectly decided, for reasons discussed in text at notes 131-
47 supra. 
